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ABSTRACT
Matt Curtin's Brute Force is a primarily personal account of one
early effort to harness the power of distributed computing. In
1997, Mr. Curtin and other members of the DESCHALL (DES
Challenge) project built, distributed, and managed software that
united thousands of computers, many of them ordinary personal
computers, in the search for a single decryption key among 72
quadrillion possibilities. The DESCHALL project sought to
demonstrate that DES, then the U.S. national standard encryption
algorithm, was no longer as secure as advertised. While Brute
Force also offers some background on encryption regulation,
export control policy, and other aspect of the Crypto Wars, it
succeeds best as an almost diaristic account of the technical and
organizational challenges at the heart of one of the earliest large-
scale widely dispersed volunteer computing projects. The DES
cracking project chronicled in Brute Force exemplifies the
interplay between technology and politics. More importantly,
Brute Force reminds us that although we survived one round of the
Crypto Wars without actual controls on the use of cryptography,
and indeed with some substantial relaxation of the export control
regime that stood in the way of the routine adoption of strong
crypto in many types of software, that result was not inevitable -
and might again come under threat.
Matt Curtin's Brute Force: Cracking the Data Encryption Standard(Brute Force)' is a personal account of a battle in the first round of the
Crypto Wars. It provides the fullest account in print of the cracking of
a DES message in 1997 by the DESCHALL (DES Challenge) project.
In addition, it offers a thumbnail sketch of the state of the political
debate over permissible crXptographic use and its regulation as it stood
towards the end of the 20 century. However, other books preceding
Brute Force provided a much fuller account of the surrounding policy
debates and their implications. 2 And if Brute Force was trying to be a
Matt Curtin, Brute Force: Cracking the Data Encryption Standard (2005).
2 See, e.g., Whitfield Diffie & Susan Landau, Privacy on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping
and Encryption (1998). See also Stefan A. Brands, Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and
Digital Certificates: Building in Privacy (2000).
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thriller along the lines of The Cukoo's Egg3 or The Eudaemonic Pie --
and there are some quite thrilling, or at least quite entertaining, stories
to be told about the Crypto Wars -- this account, although very clear
and workmanlike, probably will not be beach reading.
The decryption of a DES message by brute force - relying on
distributed computing power provided by an army of volunteers
coordinated over the Internet - was an important milestone in the
movement to make strong cryptography more generally available (and
exportable from the U.S.), although only one of many. The decryption
signaled the vulnerability of the existing standard, and helped pave the
way for a new and better one. As it happens, however, there are
increasing signs that the second round of the Crypto Wars may soon
be upon us. Brute Force is thus a timely reminder of the role of
individuals in the battle to secure free access to the cryptographic tools
that make strong electronic privacy possible.
The numbers of people and machines involved in the various
competing DES key searches was a peculiar social phenomenon. As
Whit Diffie, one of the fathers of modem asymmetric encryption put
it:
Exhaustive key search is a surprising problem to have
enjoyed such popularity. To most people who have
considered the problem, it is obvious that a search through
256 possibilities is doable if somewhat tedious. If it [is a]
mystery why so many of them, myself included, have
worked to refine and solidify their estimates, it is an even
greater mystery that in the late 1990s, some people have
actually begun to carry out key searches. 5
But search they did, reaching a rate of over 600 trillion keys per day.
6
3 Clifford Stoll, The Cukoo's Egg: Tracking A Spy Through the Maze of Computer Espionage
(1989) (giving a dramatic account of an early attempt to fight a wily hacker).
4 Thomas A. Bass, The Eudaemonic Pie (1985) (detailing the author's attempt to beat a casino
with high-tech tools).
5 Whitfield Diffie, Foreword to Electronic Frontier Foundation, Cracking DES: Secrets of
Encryption Research, Wiretap Politics, and Chip Design xi (1998),
http://web.archive.org/web/19981202092932/http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Crypto-misclD
ESCracker/HTML/19980716_diffiecrackingdesjforeword.html.
6 Curtin, supra note 1, at 252.
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There are 72 quadrillion possible DES keys, but a brute force attacker
would only have to test them all if she were exceedingly unlucky. The
expected value of the number of keys one needs to test is 50% of the
total keyspace, although the actual number could be anything from one
to the full lot. In the event, the DESCHALL group was somewhat
lucky: They found the key on June 18,7 after testing about a quarter of
the keyspace over a five month period.8 Even the peak rate of 600
trillion keys represented less than 1% of the total keyspace per day.
But the testing rate was rising rapidly, and Mr. Curtin reports that
DESCHALL projected that it would have taken only 36 days to test
the remaining three quarters of the keys.
9
Although few are aware of it, almost every person in the developed
world relies on encryption. From interbank financial transactions to
ATM cards, from web connections to military communications, from
car door openers to building security passes, modem activities depend
on the ability to secure information and to release it only to users who
can demonstrate they are entitled to have it. Encryption is a shield
against eavesdroppers and intruders, but it is a shield that functions as
a kind of sword: The ability to secure communications empowers not
only those with lawful purposes, but potentially those with illicit goals
as well. The same cryptographic authentication technologies that
enable us to ensure that other people are who they claim to be can also
with, at most minor changes, be enlisted to cloak identity online.
At their heart, cryptographic formulae (and the products which
instantiate them) rely on abstract principles of set theory, and on
cryptographers with a special sort of mathematical insight that builds
strong codes and understands how to find their potential weaknesses.
These formulae then have to be translated into software, introducing
new rounds of potential vulnerabilities.10
Ciphers come in two basic varieties, symmetric and asymmetric.
In either case, to encrypt a message one use the cipher to encrypt a
message by applying a unique encryption "key." In general, well-
designed algorithms of both sorts share the property that a longer
encryption key makes for a more securely encrypted message. And,
7 Id. at 259-260.
8 The actual number of keys tested was 18,859,645,992,960. Worldwide effort cracks DES,
ZDNet (June 23, 1997), http://us.cryptosoft.de/snews/jun97/23069705.htm.
9 Curtin, supra note 1, at 254.
10 See generally Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source
Code in C (1994).
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again speaking in very general terms, code-breaking happens in one of
three ways: (1) attackers find a weakness in the algorithm (or its
implementation); (2) attackers get a hold of the key needed to decrypt
the message by, for example, suborning the keyholder; or (3) attackers
subject the encrypted messages to a 'brute force' attack - in modem
days this means programming computers to try every possible
combination of keys until one produces something that looks like it
could be the message." Since programming computers to know that a
decrypted message is in fact a real message and not gibberish is itself a
considerable programming and computational chore, brute force
attacks especially the theoretical ones used to model the relative
strengths of two different ciphers - are usually 'known plaintext
attacks' based on searching for some known character string in the
decrypted message.
In 1977, the U.S. government selected a symmetric cipher to be the
"Data Encryption Standard" for private and non-classified use. 12 The
single standard, the government reasoned, would enhance
interoperability, which it had previously concluded was threatened by
the emergence of competing cryptographic products that were unable
to communicate with each other. The lack of interoperability among
commercial cryptographic products deterred firms from using
encryption as much as they should.
DES is a single-key symmetric cipher: the sender and the receiver
use the same key to encrypt and decrypt the message. 14 The strength
1 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is The Key: Cryptography, The Clipper Chip, And
The Constitution, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 709 app. at 885-889 (1995), available at
www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/clipper.htm.
12 DES, issued as FIPS 46 in January 1977, was reviewed, slightly revised, reaffirmed for
federal government use in 1983 and 1987, and reissued as FIPS 46-1 in January 1988; on
September 11, 1992, NIST announced a third review of FIPS 46-1, DES, and reaffirmed it for
another five years as FIPS 46-2. Revision of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)
46-1 Data Encryption Standard (DES), 58 Fed. Reg. 69,347, 69,347-48 (Dec. 30, 1993). DES
was approved for use by the government for its sensitive information, but not for classified
information. Id. at 69,348.
13 Encryption Algorithm for Computer Data Protection, 40 Fed. Reg. 12,134 (Mar. 17, 1975)
("In order to insure compatibility of secure data, it is necessary to establish a data encryption
standard and develop guidelines for its implementation and use.").
14 With a symmetric cipher, whatever you do to encode a message, you just do the reverse to
decode it. It follows that if an attacker knows the algorithm used to encode a message, and he
knows the key used to encode it, the attacker has everything he needs to decode the message.
Symmetric ciphers, even quite complicated and sophisticated ones, can be fast enough to use
for real-time applications such as telephones as well as for asynchronous communications
such as email. See generally Froomkin, supra note 11, at 890-94.
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of a cipher is measured by its binary key length. 15 All other things
being equal, longer keys mean stronger ciphers, with each additional
bit raising the theoretical complexity of a brute force cracking effort
(one that tries every possible key) by a power of two. DES keys are
fifty-six bits (about eight ASCII characters) long. 16 This means that
there are seventy-two quadrillion (actually 72,057,594,037,927,936)
different possible keys.' But even the longest key in the world is of
no use unless the underlying algorithm is sound - and whether that is
the case is much harder to determine than the key length.
The government stated that by certifying the quality of the
algorithm used in DES, it would reassure potential users that the
system was strong enough to resist attack, something that most users
would be unable to determine for themselves. Government
endorsement had value to the private sector: Cryptography is hard;
subtle errors can make a seemingly formidable system turn out to be
much more vulnerable than ever suspected. As the National Security
Agency (NSA) is acknowledged to have an excellent cryptography
staff, government endorsement would give confidence that a cipher
was unlikely to have hidden vulnerabilities. Similarly, government
endorsement provided financial institutions and others with a degree
of legal cover; were the cipher to prove vulnerable, the fact that it
carried the U.S. government imprimatur likely would protect against a
negligence claim. In contrast, reliance on any other system created a
heavy burden of due diligence, not to mention the prospect of genuine
risk.
The trouble was that while DES had to be algorithmically strong,
its keys could not be too strong or DES would get in the way of the
government's desire to be able to decrypt private messages for law
enforcement and intelligence purposes. An earlier version of the
cipher used a key with well over one hundred bits,18 yet the published
standard fixed the key at fifty-six bit. This raised fears that the
government intended the shortened key to frustrate corporate
15 Actually, not all ciphers use keys in the same way, so to compare the relative strengths of
different ciphers it is sometimes necessary to use a conversion factor.
16 FIPS 46-2, supra note 12, at 69,348.
17 Gilles Garon & Richard Outerbridge, DES Watch: An Examination of the Sufficiency of the
Data Encryption Standard for Financial Institution Information Security in the 1990s, 15
Cryptologia 177, 179 (1991).
18 Schneier, supra note 10, at 221.
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eavesdroppers while still permitting the NSA to break it if necessary. 19
These fears about the weakness of DES intensified as computers
got faster. Good cryptographers are some of the most professionally
paranoid people on earth, so it does not take much in the way of a
possible vulnerability to scare them. And by the late 1990s, experts
were worried that DES might be vulnerable to brute force attacks by
private attackers armed with purpose-built machines, as well as attacks
by governments. In an effort to draw attention to these concerns, in
early 1997, RSA Data Security, a company that sold strong
cryptography tools, offered $10,000 to anyone who could decode a
message that RSA had encrypted with DES.
The RSA challenge inspired competing efforts to crack the DES
message using distributed processing in which a very large number of
computers, from PCs on up, linked together via the Internet. Mr.
Curtin, along with Rocke Verser and Justin Dolske, played a key role
in organizing DESCHALL, the one which succeeded.
In 1997, Matt Curtin was a young software security expert
working for an Internet startup.20 A crypto-hobbyist from an early
age, he was intrigued when, on January 28, 1997, RSA put out thirteen
challenges to the code-breaking community, each at a different level
of difficulty, and each with an increasingly large prize. 21 The message
for the 40-bit challenge, the easiest, was decrypted by Ian Goldberg in
only 3.5 hours. Foreshadowing the method used to crack DES,
Goldberg took advantage of the computing power of 250 workstations
in order to find the message encrypted by RSA: "The unknown
message is: This is why you should use a longer key."22 Within
thirteen days, the 48-bit message (i.e. 28 times more difficult than the
40-bit challenge) had also been decoded by a parallel-computing
project. 23
DES seemed almost within reach - or was it? The government said
the difficulty of breaking the 48-bit key showed that brute forcing
DES was still very hard. After all, thirteen days of massively parallel
computing could not be deployed casually to decrypt just anything.
19 James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency 347
(1982).
20 Curtin, supra note 1, at 43.
21 Id. at 44-45.
22 Id. at 45.
23 1d. at 46.
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Moving to a 56-bit key from a 48-bit key added another 28 times more
difficulty over the 48-bit key. If the work proceeded at the pace of the
48-bit crack, it was forecast to take nine years. The government
contemporaneously estimated that a $30 million purpose-built
computer could do the job in about 15 months. 24 Even that hardly
suggested a cipher on its last legs. The private sector, reading the
trend lines, said it was only a matter of time, and that even the cracks
of the shorter keys showed that DES was near the end of its useful
life.2
5
Spurred by the RSA challenge, DES became the next big target.
Mr. Curtin decided to have a hand in cracking it, helping to found an
effort that came to be called DESCHALL, for DES Challenge. The
story of DESCHALL occurs on three levels in Brute Force: a personal
narrative, a technological struggle, and the effort's political context.
PERSONAL
For a field founded on some fairly abstract number theory,
cryptography seems surprisingly well populated with outlandish
figures who are almost larger-than-life. One thinks of Whit Diffie,
who along with the Martin Hellman and Ralph Merkle discovered -- or
rather, since we now know that the British secret signals intelligence
agency, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), had
already found it, rediscovered 26 -- public key cryptography. There is
also Bruce Schneier, author of the indispensable Applied
Cryptography,27 and Phil Zimmerman, perhaps strong cryptography's
greatest popularizer thanks to his "Pretty Good Privacy" Encryption
Program, not to mention the makers of RSA, the leading commercial
purveyor of strong crypto. Matt Blaze and several others found flaws
in highly touted products. David Chaum patented some brilliant ideas
for electronic cash and then held the patents so close to his chest that
he almost killed off the market. And, of course, there were Eric
Hughes, Tim May, "Lucky Green," "Black Unicorn" and the rest of
the amazingly heterogeneous crew who populated the Cypherpunks
'
4 Id. at 53.
25 Id. at 54-55.
26 See generally Public-key Cryptography, wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publickey
(last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
27 Schneier, supra note 10.
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mailing list. The Cypherpunks thought that building systems that
would allow people to communicate without fear of eavesdroppers,
'blacknet' networks of anonymous untraceable speech, and anonymous
tradable e-cash would change the world. If some basic institutions
such as the IRS or the FBI were subverted along the way, a significant
minority might have cheered (at least back in the days before they got
their current well-paid jobs as security professionals).
Unfortunately, as few of these people had a role in the organization
of DESCHALL project, almost none of these characters appear in
Brute Force, and if they do, they are at most a tangential presence.
While we learn something about DESCHALL's competitors,
especially SolNET, they are seen from their public statements and e-
mails. This viewpoint reflects the day-to-day perspective of the
insiders at DESCHALL, but one would have liked to hear other views
more directly. There seems to have been no systematic attempt to
interview the participants in the competing projects such as SoINET,
for example, and let them tell their stories in their own words.
Instead, we have only Mr. Curtin - or rather, we have his
professional side. While Mr. Curtin's diary-like account of the
DESCHALL project is primarily concerned with his and his
colleagues' experiences with regards to the DES cracking project,
there are relatively few biographical or personal details in Brute Force
regarding him28 or other characters involved in the Crypto Wars. The
DES crack was clearly an engrossing affair for those who ran it; it was
also of interest to those who, like me, just joined the effort by running
code-cracking program, but it is unclear to me how much the rest of
the world is going to care about the minutiae of the effort. The
unfortunate fact is that Brute Force succeeds best as raw material for
some future historian, less well as a suspenseful tale, and much less
well as an introduction to either the high or even the low politics of the
time.
That said there are fun stories in the book, some which seem not
just true, but familiar. I was particularly amused by the accounts of
fruitless attempts to persuade authorities at Yale and Northwestern to
allow students to run the DESCHALL client in the labs. The Yale
computer lab administrator ignorantly objected that "we don't want to
wear out the processors;" at Northwestern the objection was that there
was no reason why the university should be "helping" RSA, a private
company. 29 It certainly made me feel a little better about my
28 Mr. Curtin's homepage suggests he's quite an interesting person. See
http://www.interhack.net/people/cmcurtin/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
29 Curtin, supra note 1, at 124-25.
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unsuccessful attempt to get the staff to run a similar client,
distributed.net, 30  at the University of Miami. Our system
administrators objected that they did not know what effect it would
have on the network, and also did not want to be involved in anything
that had a monetary prize attached. At the time, that felt like an
unreasonable decision and it is interesting to learn that there was a lot
of it around. It is also interesting to learn of the tensions between
DESCHALL and the "Bovine project" behind distributed.net: Curtin's
group thought that the Bovine project should have waited until the
DES challenge was finished before targeting a different 56-bit cipher,
RC-5, so as to avoid competition for computing resources. Plus,
Curtin explains that he thought that RC-5 was "not an interesting
target" because it secured mostly web communications rather than the
financial and commercial data secured with DES. In addition, RC-5
could use longer keys; DES could not. A crack to 56-bit RC-5 could
be remedied by using longer keys. A response to a DES crack would
require a whole new encryption standard. Although computationally
equivalent, Mr. Curtin argues cracking DES was politically significant
in a way that cracking 56-bit RC-5 never could be.
TECHNICAL
The technical challenge in a brute force attempt to test every key
was substantial because the DES-cracking effort was not, as had been
the case for so many code-cracking exploits in history, 32 the effort of a
small team of canny cryptographers or the harnessing of a single
massive supercomputer. Instead, the DES effort harnessed the power
of a massively parallel and nationally distributed volunteer army of
computers, ranging from the desktop PC to the large university
laboratory machine, probably then the largest effort of its kind in
history.
The way it worked was deceptively simple. Participants would
download a "client" program that would do the actual work of trying
keys to see if they were the one, which decoded the message. The
30 Why I picked Distributed.net instead of DESCHALL or some other consortium, I no longer
recall. I do remember that the distributed.net client had a nice cow logo and sent funny
messages every time it got keys from the server. Distributed.net, http://distributed.net (last
visited Jan. 31, 2006).
31 Curtin, supra note 1, at 166.
32 See, e.g. David Kahn, The Code Breakers: The Story of Secret Writing (1967).
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client program ran in the background, and it got out of the way
whenever the user wanted to actually do something with her computer.
But since many machines, especially those in corporate and academic
labs, sit idle for long periods (at night and during holidays), there was
a massive amount of potential computing power just going to waste
and ripe for DESCHALL and its competitors to harvest.
At the heart of the scheme was a "server" which kept track of
which keys had been served out to clients, and which had been
returned as tested. The idea was to ensure that every key got one - but
only one - trial. Keys were served in blocks adjusted for the speed of
the machine asking for work to do, but even when lumped into large
blocks, seventy-two quadrillion keys take a fair amount of
management.
The organizational and administrative efforts required to harness
the power of otherwise idle computers is indeed a story worth telling,
and one with ongoing implications. Added to that, there was indeed a
need to optimize code so that it would run faster and faster - and the
optimization problem was multiplied by several times given the
divergent architectures of the various machines harnessed to the task.
Brute Force does a good job of explaining the technical aspects of this
challenge and how it was surmounted. Indeed, the DESCHALL code
itself was a remarkable achievement, "especially with the Pentium and
Pentium Pro processors, [Rocke] Verser's code was able to run at a
phenomenal speed, allowing modest desktop computers with Intel
processors to run circles around $20,000 scientific workstations. '" 33
Managing the clients was a big job, too: To test as many keys as
possible, the software needed to be optimized at quite a low level for
the peculiar features of the architecture of the various computer chips
in wide circulation. Code optimized for an Intel chip was not going to
work nearly as efficiently on an AMD chip or on one of Sun
Microsystem's powerful SPARCstations. And even if it worked at all,
sub-optimal code widely disbursed could represent a lost opportunity
to do millions of extra key trials. As the code changed and improved,
participants had to be encouraged to update their clients; meanwhile,
whenever possible, the central registry had to remain backwards
compatible with older clients in order not to waste any work.
While its general aim was to get as many machines as possible
running the fastest clients possible, the DESCHALL project was
hobbled in one important way. U.S. export control laws had long
treated DES as if it were a component for a dangerous weapon. DES
33 Curtin, supra note 1, at 94.
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could not be exported without a license, which required an onerous
application form; the penalty for an illegal export included five years
in jail. The rules were loosening, but not wanting to take risks the
DESCHALL project organizers decided to limit downloads of their
clients to persons who could claim a U.S. address and whose computer
had a U.S. internet protocol (IP) number. This complied with U.S.
export control regulations for software. 34 As a result, DESCHALL
was a U.S.-only operation; SolNET, its major competitor, faced no
such limit since it was based abroad and there is no law preventing the
import of cryptographic software to the U.S. Worse, the addition of
the IP number check into the equation introduced another point of
failure - and it did fail quite spectacularly at least once, blocking an
unknown number of downloads from legitimate users.
Curtin's own role was primarily in working on the software on the
server end, which harnessed all this horsepower for the common task.
This, too, was no small feat. While the idea had been around on paper
for some time, the infrastructure for organizing a very disparate set of
machines had to be built almost from scratch. The problems of
sending all the machine keys to work on recording the results,
preventing duplication while making sure that no possible
combinations were skipped, and ensuring that the computers available
wasted as little time as possible waiting for instructions were all
formidable ones; and even more so in the days can it only be eight
years ago? - when many people, even those with access to high-
powered computers, relied on slow dial-up services to link their
computers. Curtin does a very good job of explaining the problems
and their resolution in terms that should easily be accessible to the
non-specialist.
Perhaps of even greater significance than cracking one DES
message was the demonstration of the sheer power that could be
harnessed by distributed computing. It is indeed true that "quantity
has a quality all its own"36 And while a lot of the heavy lifting was
done by very large machines, a very respectable fraction of the search
was conducted by desktop computers. Annoyingly, Curtin does not
organize his statistics in ways that make inter-temporal comparison
easy, but he does tell us that even quite late in the project, when the
larger machines were doing a greater fraction of the key searching,
34Id. at 68.
3 Id. at 250-52.
36 Id. at 116 (quoting Justin Dolske).
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"daily statistics showed that roughly forty percent of the work was
being done by small domains - those contributing less than one percent
of the total processing power. Another ten percent was being done by
even smaller domains - those contributing less than one-half percent of
the total. 3 7 Indeed, the machine that actually found the key was a
Pentium 90, not a supercomputer.
38
POLITICAL
RSA's challenge had a political aspect, one not lost on the hard-
core participants in DESCHALL. The organizers of the DES-crack
campaign wanted the crack to make a statement about the need for
stronger mass-market cryptography, as well as a geeky desire to
surmount a challenge and win a contest; a substantial fraction of the
people who lent their computers to the effort undoubtedly shared one
or both impulses.
Cryptography was once the domain of military code-makers and
especially code-breakers, 39 but it has broken out into the mainstream
of computer science and mathematical research. A surprisingly
swashbuckling cast of characters caused this transformation, people
who together moved modem cryptography from a specialist field
dominated by spies and counter-spies into something far more
mainstream, but also more unruly. Even if most of the recent
cryptographic pioneers were not actual revolutionaries, they were
often the sort of strong libertarians who believed deeply in individual
autonomy. They self-consciously saw their work as helping to
preserve and to expand human freedom, as heading off otherwise
powerful tendencies of states to use new technologies to create
Orwellian systems of information control.
This attitude quickly brought them into conflict with intelligence
agencies and with law enforcement. Intelligence agencies thought that
the rise of consumer cryptography would result in a lethal threat to the
so-called 'national technical means' of information gathering.40 Law
enforcement agencies, in addition to carrying the spear for the more
reclusive intelligence agencies, argued loudly that allowing criminals
37 Id. at 253 (quoting Rocke Verser).
3 1Id. at 261.
39 See Kahn, supra note 32.
40 See Froomkin, supra note 11.
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to encrypt their phone and email communications would dangerously
undermine wiretaps and other similar investigative techniques that the
police required to detect and to prosecute organized crime and worse.
The specter of wiretaps becoming useless also worried prosecutors,
who well understood the dramatic impact of evidence of a conspiracy
that could be played to the jury in the defendant's own voice; if the bad
guys started encrypting all their telephone calls, these dramatic
moments would be no more.
Thus, the battle over the use and regulation of modem
cryptography arose, the so-called Crypto Wars.4 ' On one side, a
heterogeneous group of mathematicians, businessmen, civil (and even
uncivil) libertarians, students and even the occasional anarchist,
creating and seeking to deploy cryptographic tools. On the other side
were government officials trying to protect surveillance and
intelligence techniques against the specter of wide-spread military-
grade cryptography which might be too difficult to break.
The battles took place at many levels. For example, the
government sought at one point to argue that some ideas are 'classified
at birth,' that whenever anyone works them out, even from unclassified
sources, their very importance to national security means that the
result should nonetheless be considered classified.42 The obvious First
Amendment problems with this prior restraint on speech not to
mention the terrible publicity it caused,43 doomed it to failure. 4
The primary means that the U.S. government used to slow the
spread of strong cryptography relied on U.S. export control law. By
preventing the export of cryptography, the government not only
slowed its adoption abroad, but also at home. There were and are no
legal controls on the production or use of strong cryptographic
products by U.S. citizens or residents within the U.S., nor have there
ever been in peacetime. However, for many years the U.S. limited the
41 Cf A. Michael Froomkin, It Came From Planet Clipper: The Battle Over Cryptographic
Key "Escrow," 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 15 (1996), available at
www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/planet-clipper.htm.
42 See Bamford, supra note 19, at 354-58.
43 See id.
44 Under the Inventions Secrecy Act of 1951, codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (2005), the
government retains the ability to apply secrecy orders to patented inventions, even those
produced by private parties. At the end of fiscal year 2005, there were 4,915 secrecy orders in
effect, almost all of these likely applied to government-produced inventions. FAS Project on
Government Secrecy, Invention Secrecy, http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/invention/ (last
visited Jan. 31, 2006). See Bamford, supra note 19, at 355-56.
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export of cryptographic systems with keys over 40 bits and also put
tight limits on sharing the know-how to produce them.45 Although
banks and a few other high-value users were allowed to use a stronger
variant, 3DES, even basic DES was officially rated as so strong that
the government deemed it a dual-use technology, ranking it as
dangerous as the trigger that might be used for an atomic bomb. Thus,
under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 46 DES
had been treated as something so dangerous that it could only be
exported with a license.
At the time of the events in Brute Force, the U.S. was in the
process of de-controlling the export of DES, yet it was still fighting a
rear-guard action against the spread of consumer cryptography. 47 By
making the grant of export permission chancy and less than instantly
rapid, the government introduced a substantial speed bump into the
production cycle of software. Contrary to its caricature, U.S. export
control policy was not premised on the false idea that foreigners
cannot program (although, in fact, implementing cryptographic
protocols without introducing exploitable errors is a difficult task 4 8),
but rather relied on the reluctance of vendors to take risks that might
slow the shipping of products, or worse might require them to support
different versions of the same product for the domestic and export
markets.
A seemingly more promising governmental strategy (for a while at
least) was to offer the private sector an improved version of
government-endorsed strong cryptography in exchange for acceptance
of a government 'back door' which would allow the U.S. government
to decrypt private messages using the cipher with relative ease. 49 The
45 There are, however, reasons to doubt the constitutionality of these limits. See Bernstein v.
Dept. of State, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) (declaring portions of ITAR relating to
cryptographic source code were unconstitutional prior restraint in violation of the First
Amendment), reh'g granted withdrawn sub nom. Bernstein v. Dept. of Justice, 192 F.3d 1308
(9th Cir. 1999). Cf. EFF, http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Crypto-exportlBemsteincasel
20000303_bemsteinpr.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006) (explaining circumstances of
subsequent remand to District Court); Cf. Bernstein v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, No. C 95-
0582 MHP, 2004 WL 838163 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2004) (noting case had become moot due to
changes in ITAR and due to government's determination that Bernstein was not subject to
prosecution under the new rules). See also Froomkin, supra note 11.
46 International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1-120.20 (2005).
47 See Froomkin, supra note 41.
48 See Schneier, supra note 10.
49 See generally, Diffie & Landau, supra note 2; Froomkin, supra note 11; Froomkin, supra
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algorithm, known variously as the Clipper Chip, Fortezza, and
SKIPJACK, never achieved significant commercial adoption in part
because of domestic and foreign mistrust of the U.S. government.
5 0
Gradual loosening of the export control regime combined with the
widespread availability of both foreign-produced strong crypto and
domestic escapees from the increasingly porous ITAR regime also
reduced potential demand. Ultimately, however, the U.S. government
did accept that DES was no longer secure enough for the private
sector, and in 2001 it adopted the "Advanced Encryption Standard"
(AES) as a DES replacement. 5 1 Interestingly, the National Institute of
Science and Technology began the process that five years later would
result in the adoption of the AES on January 2, 1997. That is just
before RSA issued the DES challenge.
LESSONS LEARNED
Brute Force is especially timely. The DES-cracking experience
teaches us several lessons with particular relevance today.
The first is that technology influences politics. The 1997 "crack"
recounted in Brute Force did not in itself render DES transparent: it
decoded only one message, and only after some substantial effort. The
72 quadrillion possibilities amongst which DES concealed encrypted
texts remained a formidable barrier for any but the rare determined
and powerful attacker. But by showing that DES was no longer
invulnerable, and that as computing power increased by leaps and
bounds it could only become more vulnerable, the DES crack effort
marked one of the turning points in the struggle to spread strong
cryptography, itself a project that remains controversial to this day.
And, indeed, the threat to DES quickly became much more real.
In July 1998, shortly after the DESCHALL effort, John Gilmore, Paul
Kotcher, and the EFF built an optimized DES-cracking computer
note 41.
50 See Froomkin, supra note 41.
51 Announcing Approval of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 197, AdvancedEncryption Standard (AES), 66 Fed. Reg. 63,369 (Dec. 6, 2001). Cf CSRC, AES
http:llcsrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkitlaes/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2006) (documenting history of
adoption of AES). AES can have a keyspace of 128, 196, or 256 bits, making it
monumentally stronger than DES. DES, however, was only officially retired last May. See
National Institute of Standards and Technology Announcing Approval of the Withdrawal of
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 46-3, Data Encryption Standard (DES); FIPS
74, Guidelines for Implementing and Using the NBS Data Encryption Standard; and FIPS 81,
DES Modes of Operation, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,907 (May 19, 2005).
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("Deep Crack") for about $250,000.52 Working alone, Deep Crack
found a DES key in only 56 hours. 53 A subsequent effort uniting the
efforts of Deep Crack and a distributed processing team managed the
feat in 22 hours and fifteen minutes.5 4 DES was not just on the ropes,
it was exposed as insecure.55
The second is that cryptography is a critical technology. There has
never before been so much information collected and collated about so
many. As I have argued elsewhere, the only defense to privacy-
busting technology available to most of us is to keep our information
private in the first place. 6 For electronic communications, strong
crypto is our first line of defense - and maybe our only defense -
against third parties seeking to capture our data.
The third is that not all "cracking" is bad. The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), which among other things criminalizes the
cracking of copy-protection systems, exemplifies a contrary stance,
one we would do well to question. Suppose that DES had been
protected by a DMCA-like rule, and that attempts to meter its
increasing vulnerability had thus been illegal. The public, Congress,
and policymakers all would have run the risk of remaining in the dark
as to the real vulnerabilities of their tools, and might have enjoyed a
dangerous false sense of security as a result. As Curtin puts it:
DMCA prohibits any attempt to defeat an "effective"
technical means of copyright enforcement. Putting the
obvious logical question aside--an effective mechanism
would withstand attack, so what's the point of prohibiting
attack?--we are still left with a troubling question. If
52 The story of the construction of this DES cracker is told (complete with wiring diagrams) in
EFF, Cracking DES Secrets of Encryption Research, Wiretap Politics & Chip Design: How
federal agencies subvert privacy (1998), available at http://cryptome.org/cracking-des.htm.
53 Curtin, supra note 1, at 272.
14 Id. at 273.
55 But consider the wise words of Whit Diffie: [Ciryptosystems have nine lives. The most
convincing argument that DES is insecure would not outweigh the vast investment in DES
equipment that has accumulated throughout the world. People will continue using DES
whatever its shortcomings, convincing themselves that it is adequate for their needs. And
DES, with its glaring vulnerabilities, will go on pretending to protect information for decades
to come. Diffie, supra note 5.
56 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1461 (2000), available
at http://osaka.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/privacy-deathof.pdf.
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consumers cannot independently verify the security of such
systems and if we cannot understand how these systems are
likely to fail, how are we supposed to ensure their validity?
5 7
Fourth, export controls on software can impose real costs on U.S.
companies and academics. Due to U.S. export rules, the DESCHALL
team felt compelled to limit themselves to U.S. computers. Being
based outside the U.S., its foreign competitor was not subject to U.S.
export control rules and thus could solicit both U.S. and foreign
participants. DESCHALL managed to win without a level playing
field, but such U.S. victories are far from inevitable in the future,
especially as computer resources are more widely spread around the
world.
Fifth, and perhaps most important at this juncture, Brute Force can
serve as a reminder that we have survived one round of the Crypto
Wars without actual controls on the use of cryptography, and indeed
with some substantial relaxation of the export control regime that
stood in the way of the routine adoption of strong crypto in many
types of software, notably consumer operating systems. But that was
something of a close-run thing, a result due in part to the activism of
people like Matt Curtin. And it could be that the forces favoring
domestic cryptography regulation might make a comeback.
Just recently the FCC issued a Report and Order58 and
accompanying policy statement5 9 as part of its attempt to assert broadjurisdiction over Internet telephony and other Internet-based
communication services. As part of its sweeping vision of the scope
of federal regulation over computer-based communications, the FCC
stated it believed that, "to encourage broadband deployment and
preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the public
Internet, consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of
57 Curtin, supra note 1, at 280.
18 FCC, Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and
Services, 70 Fed. Reg. 59,664 (Oct. 13, 2005) (adopting "a rule establishing that providers of
facilities-based broadband Internet access services and providers of interconnected voice over
Internet Protocol (VoIP) services--meaning VoIP service that allows a user generally to
receive calls originating from and to terminate calls to the public switched telephone network
(PSTN)--must comply with the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA)").
59 FCC, Policy Statement, Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities et al. (2005), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/
FCC-05-151A1.pdf.
2006]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement.,'6  Of course,
this is just a policy statement, not a legally binding decision ... for
now. And there are reasons to doubt whether the FCC's
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)
authority stretches nearly as far as it wants us to believe, 61 much less
into the realm of desktop software. 62  The FCC statement is
nonetheless significant, for it cannot have come out of nowhere: It
must reflect the agenda of at least a portion of the law enforcement
community. Most likely these are the same people who made
maximalist demands in the original CALEA process, seeking to
optimize the telephone system for wiretapping, and who are now
making similarly broad demands in regard to Voice Over IP (VoIP)
and other communications that travel over the Internet such as Instant
Messenger (IM).63  The FCC's concern here seems to be to prevent
end-users from installing software that would let them do VolP-like
things while evading the infrastructures that the FCC intends to
mandate to make VolP wiretap-friendly. As the FCC stated in the
preamble to its recent regulation:
The overwhelming importance of CALEA's assistance
capability requirements to law enforcement efforts to
safeguard homeland security and combat crime weighs
heavily in favor of the application of CALEA obligations to
all facilities-based broadband Internet access service
providers... It is clearly not in the public interest to allow
terrorists and criminals to avoid lawful surveillance by law
enforcement agencies by using broadband Internet access
60 Id. at 3.
61 See FCC, First Report and Order, Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
and Broadband Access and Services 13 (2005), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/
attachmatch/ FCC-05-153Al.pdf (concluding that CALEA applies to facilities-based
broadband Internet access providers and providers of interconnected VoIP service).
62 The FCC's recent First Report and Order purports to apply CALEA standards to VolP.
This order is being challenged in the DC Circuit. See Cynthia Brumfield, EFF, CDT and
Pulver to Appeal FCCs CALEA Rules, IP & Democracy, Oct. 24, 2005,
http://www.ipdemocracy.com/archives/2005/10/24/index.php#000653.
63 See Susan P. Crawford, Shortness Of Vision: Regulatory Ambition In The Digital Age, 74
Fordham L. Rev. 695, 714-24 (2005); Joshua E. Adrian, Recent Developments In
Administrative Law VoIP On Tap: Whether The FCC Should Apply Wiretapping Standards To
Voice Over Internet Protocol, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 647 (2005).
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services as a substitute for dial-up service.64
Whether the FCC has the authority under current law or would
need some new authority, once we have articulated the goal of trying
to ensure that users cannot use VoIP without the possibility of being
wiretapped, it is only one more step down the same path to regulating
cryptography as well. After all, strong end-user cryptography
threatens the ability of law enforcement and other government
agencies to extract meaning even when armed with a legal wiretap
order. Is it too far-fetched to worry that perhaps the government might
seek some form of 'trusted computing' solution in which
cryptographically secured devices seek to ensure that secure
communications only happen in permissible ways? If it were to come
to pass, round two of the Crypto Wars will have begun, and we may be
needing some Matt Curtins again.
Brute Force documents one of the early efforts to harness the
distributed processing power of the Internet. In the case of
DESCHALL, the 'intelligence' being harnessed was silicone-based,
and lay sleeping in computer labs around the nation.6 5 More recently,
in projects like Wikipedia, the intelligences being harnessed are
carbon-based. At present it seems that the many-hands-make-light-
work approach to writing and problem-solving will be one of the most
important uses of the Internet. It is useful to have an eyewitness
account of how one of those early efforts came to fruition.
64 FCC, First Report and Order, supra note 61, at 18.
65 Current projects that work on a similar basis include SETI@Home, which harnesses
distributed computation to search signals for signs of alien intelligences.
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